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Abstract ‘‘Home’’ is well known from everyday expe-
rience, plays a crucial role in all kinds of narratives about
human life, but is hardly ever systematically dealt with in
the philosophy of medicine and health care. The notion of
home is ambiguous, is often used in a metaphorical way,
and is closely related to concepts such as house and
dwelling. In this paper the phenomenon of home is
explored by means of some phenomenological writings of
Heidegger, Bollnow, Bachelard and Levinas. Common in
their views is that being at home and dwelling mean
something more fundamental than an activity we do along
with other activities, such as working and travelling.
Dwelling, building a house and being at home are fun-
damental aspects of human existence. Being human is
dwelling. While exploring the relevance of this phenom-
enological perspective for medical theory and practice,
the focus is on the care of people suffering from
dementia.
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Introduction
The term home plays an important role in all kinds of
narratives about human life. All sorts of disciplines have
contributed to our understanding of home (Perkins et al.
2002). Also in literary works, one can ﬁnd metaphors used
to describe positive experiences of being home. If there is
one thing that we can learn from a quick scan of the use of
the notion of home, it is that it is often used in a meta-
phorical sense. The essence of a metaphor can be described
as ‘‘understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in
terms and concepts of another’’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980,
p. 5). By using a metaphor we make a familiar thing look
different and realize that two seemingly unrelated experi-
ences have something in common. Metaphors may help us
to construct a conceptual image of matters, affairs, and
situations that are difﬁcult to describe in a more rational
way. Metaphors are pervasive, not only in everyday lan-
guage and thought, but also in action and everyday activ-
ities. We ﬁnd ourselves using metaphors because they
already mean something to us and to those around us.
Home is an excellent example of this intrinsic relationship
between language and everyday experience.
Talking about home is complex because of the various
levels of interpretation (Moore 2000). ‘‘Being at home’’
means something else than the more concrete ‘‘staying at
home.’’ And most of us would say that ‘‘being in the
world’’ is a more fundamental notion than ‘‘being at
home.’’ But all these distinctions depend upon the level of
philosophical consideration and the terminology used. The
various interpretations of ‘‘home’’ overlap. Home as a ﬁxed
place of abode also has a social context, the place where
one can be together with family and friends (or alone) and
where one feels comfortable. Home can refer to the place
of birth, a country, the place where one resides, where one
W. Dekkers
Center of Ethics, Radboud University Nijmegen,
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
W. Dekkers (&)
Scientiﬁc Institute for Quality of Healthcare,
Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre,
P.O. Box 9101, 6500 HB Nijmegen, The Netherlands
e-mail: w.dekkers@iq.umcn.nl
123
Med Health Care and Philos (2011) 14:291–300
DOI 10.1007/s11019-011-9307-2comes from or where one is going to. As a consequence of
this ambiguity, the idea of home is connected to many
other notions such as: roots, house, environment, family,
dwelling, intimacy, privacy, protection, security, comfort,
sacredness, and paradise.
In an earlier paper I have explored the signiﬁcance of
home for palliative care and argued that the goal of palli-
ative care should be ‘‘to bring the patient home’’ (Dekkers
2009). By exploring four interpretations of the metaphor
‘‘coming home,’’ I have tried to contribute to our under-
standing of the goals of palliative care. The four interpre-
tations of ‘‘home’’ and ‘‘coming home’’ that I have
analyzed are: (1) one’s own house or homelike environ-
ment, (2) one’s own body, (3) the psychosocial environ-
ment, and (4) the spiritual dimension, in particular, the
origin of human existence. The ﬁrst interpretation refers to
the physical place where one lives and dies, the second to
one’s bodily well-being, the third to one’s psychological
well-being, and the fourth to the process of dying.
The current paper is a further exploration of the rele-
vance of the notion of home for palliative care. By and
large, it mostly relates to the ﬁrst and third interpretation of
being at home, but it also explicitly pays attention to the
fundamental view that being human is dwelling, that is,
being at home. The ﬁrst aim of the current paper is to
present some phenomenological descriptions of home by
Heidegger, Bollnow, Bachelard and Levinas, because these
analyses are not well known in the ﬁeld of medical phi-
losophy. The second aim is to explore the relevance of
these writings for the care of people suffering from
dementia.
In the next section, I will shortly introduce the topic of
home and dementia. In the section thereafter, I will place
the study of home in a broader phenomenological context
by introducing the idea of ‘‘home-led palliative care.’’ I
will then present the views of Heidegger, Bollnow, Bach-
elard, and Levinas on dwelling, house and home. In the
ﬁnal section I will provide some comments about the rel-
evance of this phenomenological perspective for the care of
persons with dementia.
Home and dementia
In a prize-winning video ‘Going home,’ produced by Vinn
Bay and Tee Boon Leng, an older woman with dementia,
living in an East-Asian country, goes out to buy some meat
and rice for her dinner. Unfortunately, she gets lost in the
crowd of the city. She is getting confused and anxious and
implores a number of passers-by: ‘‘Can you show me the
way home,’’ ‘‘can you take me home,’’ ‘‘just take me home,
please’’ (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9iXPHhfk_7E).
The experience of this lady is paradigmatic for what I want
to discuss in this paper, that is, the signiﬁcance of home for
(the care of) people with dementia.
In a very general way, one can say that people suffering
from dementia gradually lose cognitive capabilities, con-
trol over their bodily functions, and their grip on the world.
In philosophical debates about the nature of dementia the
emphasis is very much on cognitive capabilities and the
‘‘consciousness-dimension’’ of being human, that is, on a
lack of (or loss of) personhood, autonomy, and decision-
making capacity (Hughes et al. 2006). More recently,
however, attention has also been given to the ‘‘body-
dimension’’ of dementia through an exploration of the so-
called Situation-Embodied-Agent view (the SEA-view) of
the human person (Hughes 2001; Dekkers 2010). The SEA-
view of the human person means that to be a person is to be
situated in a culture that has its own traditions and norms,
in a personal history that includes one’s wishes and psy-
chological make-up, and within the social context of
family, friends, and neighbours. To be a person is also to be
an embodied agent. Persons have a body and are a body at
the same time. The body is considered to be a fundamental
source of selfhood that does not derive its agency from a
cognitive form of knowledge (Leder 1990; Kontos 2005).
Therefore, the idea of embodiment is essential to under-
stand how dementia symptoms are an expression of the
lived body in dementia. Finally, to be a person is to be an
agent and not merely a conscious or rational being.
Empirical ﬁndings suggest that people suffering from
dementia experience their life as the breakdown of a bodily
smooth ﬂow and as the loss of the taken-for-granted way of
being-in-the-world. Based on qualitative empirical
research, Phinney and Chesla (2003) have described three
ways in which people suffering from dementia experience
this disruption of the skilled habitual body: Being slow is
about the lived body slowing down as activity becomes
halting. Being lost is about people’s difﬁculty ﬁnding their
way in an unfamiliar world, being lost in the world of
space, of equipment, and of activity. Being a blank is about
being in an empty world wherein people are unable to ﬁnd
the thoughts and words that make it possible for them to
engage in a reﬂective act.
In a very general way, the key problem of dementia
might be described as the loss of a common shared world
of meaning, that is, the loss of a common home. Behind the
question ‘where am I?,’ which is often being asked by
disoriented persons, fundamental questions might be hid-
den such as ‘who am I?’ and ‘where is my home?’ (Her-
togh and The 2008). As the video ‘Going home’
demonstrates, people with dementia want to go home or to
be at home. For many patients in a psychogeriatric insti-
tution ‘‘home’’ appears to be a key word (Meijer 1992,
1993). People with dementia who live in a nursing home
often say they have to go home because they think their
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diligently for a safe home in the sense of spiritual famil-
iarity and security. Listening to songs that they know from
their childhood can enhance feeling at home. Also, care-
givers in psychogeriatric institutions think in terms of
home. A qualitative empirical study investigating what
professional caregivers working in nursing homes consider
to be a good life for residents suffering from dementia
showed that ‘‘homeliness/good atmosphere in living situ-
ations’’ belonged to the concepts which were most often
mentioned by respondents (Kalis et al. 2005).
In this paper I will lay the ground for a further explo-
ration of what people suffering from dementia and their
caregivers mean when they express themselves in terms of
home. What does home mean to them?
Lifeworld–spatiality–home
Starting with the writings of Husserl, a rich and inﬂuential
phenomenological tradition exists, in which the lifeworld
of human beings takes a central place (Toombs 2001).
‘Lifeworld’ is a complex notion. In line with Husserl, it can
be understood as an experienced world of meaning. It has
been described as a ‘‘textured, embodied, experienced
world of coloured trees, sparkling stars, alternative ways
home, remembered seasons, happiness, joy, anguish and
sadness’’ (Todres et al. 2007, p. 55). Crucial constituents of
the lifeworld that have been recognized and described by
Husserl and other phenomenologists are: (1) temporality,
(2) spatiality, (3) intersubjectivity, (4) embodiment and (5)
mood (Todres et al. 2007).
This paper primarily focuses on the second constituent
of the lifeworld mentioned, that is, spatiality. Spatiality
refers to our being a part of the physical environing world.
Although house and home also have much broader con-
notations, they primarily refer to spatiality. In my view, it
is worthwhile to speciﬁcally focus on house and home as
an exemplary way of describing the human being’s spa-
tiality, its lifeworld, and the human condition as such. It
should be noted here, however, that, in line with a holistic
approach of the lifeworld, the ﬁve constituents just men-
tioned imply one another and are intertwined. As I will
demonstrate in this paper, this intertwining regards the
various interpretations of home as well. As has been
analyzed by Jacobson (2009), the notion of home relates
to embodiment, for example, to the Merleau-Pontian
notion of the lived body. Our experience of being at home
in a bodily way is essential to our nature as being in the
world.
While focusing on home as a particular aspect of the
spatiality of the lifeworld, I will lay the ground for a switch
from (and further speciﬁcation of) a ‘‘lifeworld-led health
care’’ as has recently been introduced (Todres et al. 2007;
Dahlberg et al. 2009) to a ‘‘home-led healthcare.’’
Heidegger, Bollnow, Bachelard and Levinas belong to
those phenomenological philosophers who have given
home a central place in their writings.
1 Phenomenology has
many faces. Heidegger and Levinas are commonly cate-
gorised among the phenomenologists, but for Bollnow and
Bachelard this is less self-evident. In his standard work The
Phenomenological Movement, Spiegelberg (1982) devotes
a whole chapter to Heidegger and Levinas as well. Boll-
now, however, is only mentioned in a note referring to his
book Das Wesen der Stimmungen (Spiegelberg 1982,
p. 418). Spiegelberg (ibid., p. 18) uses exactly twelve lines
to explain why he did not pay attention to Bachelard, even
though Bachelard explicitly calls himself a phenomenolo-
gist. His phenomenology, however, is very different from
Husserl’s pure phenomenology with which he did not want
to be associated. Bachelard’s phenomenology is ‘‘materi-
alistic’’ in nature. While many phenomenologists focus on
the human body, Bachelard’s main interest is in the
material aspects of the world, the direct surroundings of a
human being: houses, huts, rooms, attics, cellars, corners,
drawers, chests, locks and wardrobes.
2
I selected the four authors mentioned on the following
grounds. First, they can all be called phenomenologists in a
particular meaning of the term. Second, they all wrote
thoughtful papers on dwelling, house and home in the ﬁf-
ties and sixties of the twentieth century. Third, they all
present their views of home in the context of the ﬁve
constituents of the lifeworld and stress that dwelling,
building a house and being at home are fundamental
aspects of human existence. The selected writings are:
1 Also the Flemish philosopher Jacques de Visscher must be
mentioned. In his many writings on architecture, house, home, and
dwelling, the writings of the four philosophers mentioned here play an
important role. See, for example: de Visscher (1991, 1998, 1999, esp.
Chap 4 and 5). A ﬁne example of a phenomenological exploration of
home is the research project on the notion of home under the
leadership of Max van Manen of the University of Alberta (Edmon-
ton, Canada), who is also the founder of the web based project
Phenomenology Online: http://www.phenomenologyonline.com/
home.html (acccessed July 16 2010).
2 Bachelard’s position is interesting for another reason, because he
insists upon a radical difference between metaphor and image. He
acknowledges that a metaphor might give concrete substance to an
experience that is difﬁcult to put in other words, and that this
experience is related to another thing from which it differs. He argues,
however, that a metaphor is completely different from an image. In
his view, an image owes its entire being to the imagination. He calls
an image ‘‘the pure product of absolute imagination’’ (Bachelard
1964, p. 75). According to Bachelard, a metaphor cannot be studied
phenomenologically. At most it is a ‘‘fabricated image’’ (ibid., p. 75).
He goes on to say: ‘‘A metaphor is a false image, since it does not
possess the direct virtue of an image formed in spoken revery’’ (ibid.,
p. 77).
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nen Denken 1954);
– Bollnow, Lived-Space (Der erlebte Raum 1960);
– Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (La poe ´tique de
l’espace 1957);
– Levinas, Totality and Inﬁnity (Totalite ´ et inﬁni 1961).
Martin Heidegger (1889–1976): the so-called fourfold
‘‘To preserve the fourfold, to save the earth, to receive the
sky, to await the divinities, to escort mortals—this fourfold
preserving is the simple nature, the presencing, of dwell-
ing’’ (Heidegger 1971, p. 158–159).
In Sein und Zeit Heidegger (1927) describes the basic
constitution of human ‘‘Dasein’’ in a formal way as ‘‘being-
in-the world.’’
3 In Building Dwelling Thinking he takes a
more concrete approach to describe the way in which
human beings are on earth: ‘‘To be a human being means to
be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell’’ (Heidegger
1971, p. 147). The ﬁrst part of the essay deals with the
question of what it means to dwell. According to Heideg-
ger, we are inclined to think that we build a house or a
shelter in order to dwell somewhere, so that we attain to
dwelling by means of building. From this perspective,
dwelling and building are related as end and means. He-
idegger, however, criticizes this end-means relationship. In
his view, building is not merely a means and a way towards
dwelling: building is really dwelling, and dwelling is the
manner in which human beings are on earth.
4 Only if we
are capable of dwelling, we can build. ‘‘We do not dwell
because we have built, but we build and have built because
we dwell, that is, because we are dwellers’’ (ibid., p. 148).
This ‘‘being a dweller’’ not only refers to an anthropolog-
ical characteristic of human beings, but also implies a kind
of imperative. Human beings ever search anew for the
nature of dwelling and they must ever learn to dwell.
It appears that ‘‘being at home’’ in Heidegger’s writings
does not always have the same meaning. He writes: ‘‘The
truck driver is at home on the highway, but he does not
have his shelter there; the working woman is at home in the
spinning mill, but she does not have her dwelling place
there; the chief engineer is at home in the power station,
but he does not dwell there’’ (ibid., p. 143). It appears from
this quotation that ‘‘being at home’’ is used here in a weak
sense compared to the pregnant meaning in Sein und Zeit.
In Building Dwelling Thinking, being at home means
something like having practical knowledge of the situation
and knowing how to act. Being at home (in this weak
sense) is therefore different from dwelling somewhere.
5
In a next step, Heidegger broadens his scope, paying
attention not only to physical, but also to inter-relational
and theological aspects of dwelling. I am referring here to
his theory of the so-called fourfold (in German: ‘‘Geviert’’),
that is, the earth, the sky, the divinities and fellow human
beings. In Building Dwelling Thinking, Heidegger does not
provide much ontological foundation for the idea of the
fourfold. He simply argues that ‘‘on the earth’’ already
means ‘‘under the sky,’’ and that both of these also mean
‘‘remaining before the divinities,’’ and include a ‘‘belong-
ing to men’s being with one another’’ (ibid., p. 149). The
fourfold means that there are four aspects that are one at the
same time: ‘‘By a primal oneness the four—earth and sky,
divinities and mortals—belong together in one’’ (ibid,
p. 149). This means that, when we say ‘‘earth,’’ we are
already thinking of the other three along with it, however,
without giving thought to the ‘‘simple oneness of the four’’
(ibid, p. 149). The same holds for the sky, the divinities and
other mortal human beings respectively.
Although in Building Dwelling Thinking an ontological
foundation of the fourfold is missing, Heidegger’s analysis
is insightful for two reasons. First, it reminds us of his
earlier description of human ‘‘Dasein’’ as ‘‘being-in-the-
world.’’ The basic character of dwelling is to spare and to
preserve. Mortal human beings are in the world (they
dwell) by preserving the fourfold, that is, by saving the
earth, receiving the sky, awaiting the divinities and initi-
ating their own nature. Second, the idea of the fourfold
illustrates that dwelling not only refers to an activity amidst
a material environment, but also to the psychosocial and
existential dimensions of human existence: being human is
dwelling, that is, staying with and among things (ibid.,
p. 157).
The second part of Building Dwelling Thinking deals
with the question how building, in the sense of constructing
3 As Svenaeus (2000, 2001, 2002) explains, in Sein und Zeit the
notions of ‘‘homelikeness’’ (‘‘Heimischkeit’’) and ‘‘unhomelikeness’’
(‘‘Unheimlichkeit’’) play a crucial role. According to Heidegger,
unhomelikeness is, even in our everyday modes of being-in-the-
world, a basic aspect of our existence, but in our everyday life it is
hidden by the dominant being-at-home in the world. Consequently,
the being-at-home of the human being is also a being not quite at
home in this world: this is my world but it is also not entirely mine.
Therefore, health can be understood as a being-at-home that keeps the
fundamental homelessness of human existence—the not being at
home in the world—from becoming apparent.
4 To explain this, Heidegger refers to the original meaning of the
German verb ‘‘bauen’’ (to build), that is, to dwell, to remain, to stay in
a place. The old German word ‘‘bauen’’ says that man is insofar as he
dwells, but it also means at the same time to cherish and protect, to
preserve and care for, speciﬁcally to till the soil and to cultivate the
vine.
5 This weak interpretation comes close to the metaphorical meaning
of being at home as ‘‘easy motion through a landscape’’ (Krasner
2006, p. 211). A person who is at home can move ‘‘ﬂuidly through the
dwelling because body-subject knows that space intimately’’ (Se-
amon, citation in Krasner 2006).
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the example of a bridge. And again, Heidegger turns
around our primary and intuitive clariﬁcation of the func-
tion of a bridge. We are inclined to say that building a
bridge is adding something to an already existing location,
for example, by viewing the function of a bridge as a
connection between the two banks of a river. According to
Heidegger, however, a speciﬁc location rather comes into
existence by virtue of the bridge. The bridge creates a new
location. The bridge ‘‘gathers the earth as landscape around
the stream’’ (ibid., p. 152) and ‘‘gathers to itself in its own
way earth and sky, divinities and mortals’’ (ibid., p. 153).
The example of the bridge is a stepping stone towards an
analysis of space and boundaries. In Heidegger’s view, the
bridge is a thing which allows ‘‘a space into which earth
and heaven, divinities and mortals are admitted’’ (ibid.,
p. 155). A space is something that has been made room for,
something that is cleared and free for settlement and lod-
ging, within a certain boundary. A boundary is not that at
which something stops, but at which something else begins
to be present. It is the issue of space and boundary that
Bollnow concentrates on as well.
Otto Friedrich Bollnow (1903–1991):
inner and outer space
‘‘Man carves out of universal space a special and to some
extent private space and thus separates inner space from an
outer space’’ (Bollnow 1961, p. 33).
In Lived-Space Bollnow (1961) argues that philosophy
at that time was mostly concerned with the problem of the
temporal structure of human existence and neglected the
spatial constitution of human life.
6 According to him, we
need a thorough reﬂection on the problem of lived space.
The term lived space (‘‘erlebter Raum’’) is analogous to the
title of Minkowski’s book Lived Time (Le temps ve ´cu
1933). Since then, the notions ‘‘lived time’’ and ‘‘lived
space’’ (and also ‘‘lived body’’ and ‘‘lived experience’’)
have belonged to the intellectual instruments of phenom-
enologists. According to Bollnow, we need to approach the
problem of lived space ‘‘with the least possible prejudice’’
(Bollnow 1961, p. 31) and to enquire into the inner
structure of space, as it concretely appears in our experi-
ence. This is clearly the language of a phenomenologist for
whom the concrete lived space, the space in which a human
being perceives and moves, is entirely different from the
abstract space of mathematicians and scientists. The lived
space is ‘‘above and below, fore and aft, right and left, by
the direction scheme founded in the human body’’ (ibid.,
p. 32).
Considering the human being’s possibility of move-
ments in any direction in the lived space, Bollnow asks the
question: ‘‘Where is my real home?’’ (ibid., p. 32). It is in
the context of this question that he analyses the house,
which he calls ‘‘the spatial center of the life of the indi-
vidual’’ (ibid., p. 33).
First, for Bollnow, as it is for Heidegger, dwelling is a
central notion. According to him, a human being, whom he
calls ‘‘a fugitive on earth’’ (ibid. p. 33), gains a stay by
rooting himself tight to the ground with the solid walls of
his house. Dwelling somewhere is fundamental for human
beings. To dwell is not an activity like any other activity,
but a determination of human beings in which they realize
their true existence. Bollnow writes, ‘‘man needs a ﬁrm
dwelling place if he is not to be dragged along helplessly
by the stream of time’’ (ibid., p. 33).
A second characteristic of the house is related to the
difference between the inner and outer space. By building a
house, man carves out of the universal space a special and
private space. The walls of a house represent the boundary
between inner and outer space. The outside world is
characterized by three concepts: (1) breadth as contrasted
with the narrowness of the house, (2) strangeness as con-
trasted with what is known to a human being, and (3)
distance as contrasted with the closeness in the house. In
contrast to the outer space of ‘‘openness, of danger and
abandonment,’’ the space of the home provides a protected
and hidden area, in which the human being ‘‘can be
relieved of continual anxious alertness, into which he can
withdraw in order to return to himself’’ (ibid., p. 33).
Third, the boundary between inner and outer space is not
a ﬁxed one.
7 Moreover, we can cross that boundary. Inside
and outside are not just elements in an objective geomet-
rical space to be described along a couple of objective axes.
The fact that a house has doors and windows, demonstrates
the Heideggerian interpretation of a threshold, that is, a
boundary as something to cross or as an invitation to pass.
Although the house is an area of security and peace, a
human being would pine away if he locked himself in his
house to escape the dangers of the outside world. He must
6 Also in Neue Geborgenheit [New Security] Bollnow (1955) devotes
one chapter to ‘The Meaning of the House’. The broader context of
this book is a critique of an existentialist view of the human being in
which the focus is on notions such as despair (Kierkegaard), anxiety
(Heidegger) and nausea (Sartre) and the image of a human being as a
traveller (homo viator) and as a refugee ever under way. According to
Bollnow, a human being fulﬁls his existence by dwelling. Dwelling
and ﬁnding a (new) security is the very ‘‘essence’’ of his existence.
Being home or homelike being in the world is an existential aspect of
human beings not reducible to an underlying negative experience as it
is in Heidegger’s analysis.
7 Bollnow (1961) adds that the boundary between the security of the
inner space and the insecurity of the outer space in fact is a gradual
one. Around the individual house is a broader area that can also be
called a home (in German ‘‘Heimat’’).
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danger both belong to the human condition, and conse-
quently to both areas of the lived space. Human beings
need a link between inner and outer space, that is, openings
in the wall of the house: doors and windows. The phe-
nomenon of a threshold as an invitation to pass is a key
element in the analysis of the relationship between inner
and outer space (De Visscher (ed.) 1998).
Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962): reading houses
‘‘Every corner in a house, every angle in a room, every inch
of secluded space in which we like to hide, or withdraw
into ourselves, is a symbol of solitude for the imagination;
that is to say, it is the germ of a room, or of a house’’
(Bachelard 1964, p. 136).
The titles of some of Bachelard’s books, for example The
psychoanalysis of ﬁre, Water and dreams, Air and revery,
and The earth and the reveries of the will, reﬂect his interest
in the Greek classical four elements as they have been
developed by Empedocles and others: earth, water, air and
ﬁre.ComparedtoHeidegger’sschemeofthefourfold,thatis,
theearth,thesky,thedivinitiesandfellowhumanbeings,itis
primarily the earth that has attracted Bachelard’s attention.
Bachelard’s main interest is in the material aspects of the
world,thedirectsurroundingsofahumanbeing.Hiswritings
are, so to speak, rooted in the soil of everyday life. He is
especially interested in houses, huts, rooms, attics, cellars,
corners, drawers, chests, locks and wardrobes, but also in
animal nests and shells. The reason for his interest in animal
housing is that writers and poets often compare the house or
home of human beings with animal shelters.
Bachelard starts the introduction of Poetics of Space as
follows: ‘‘A philosopher who has evolved his entire
thinking from the fundamental themes of the philosophy of
science, and followed the main line of the active, growing
rationalism of contemporary science as closely as he could,
must forget his learning and break with all his habits of
philosophical research, if he wants to study the problems
posed by the poetic imagination’’ (Bachelard 1961, p. xv).
‘‘Poetic imagination’’ is a key term in Bachelard’s phe-
nomenology. He describes the phenomenology of imagi-
nation as ‘‘a study of the phenomenon of the poetic image
when it emerges in the consciousness as a direct product of
the heart, soul and being of man, apprehended in his
actuality’’ (ibid., p. xviii). In order to specify what a phe-
nomenology of the image can be, he continues, we need to
specify ‘‘that the image comes before thought’’ (ibid., p.
xx). Bachelard criticizes what he calls a phenomenology of
the mind and writes: ‘‘We should have to say that poetry,
rather than being a phenomenology of the mind, is a phe-
nomenology of the soul. We should then have to collect
documentation on the subject of the dreaming conscious-
ness’’ (ibid., p. xx).
Here are a few more quotations to illustrate Bachelard’s
very peculiar way of thinking and writing:
‘‘If I were asked to name the chief beneﬁt of the
house, I should say: the house shelters daydreaming,
the house protects the dreamer, the house allows one
to dream in peace’’ (ibid., p. 6).
‘‘The great function of poetry is to give us back the
situations of our dreams. The house we were born in
is more than an embodiment of home, it is also an
embodiment of dreams’’ (ibid., p. 15).
‘‘A phenomenologist […] takes the image just as it is,
just as the poet created it, and tries to make it his own
[…]. He brings the image to the very limit of what he
is able to imagine’’ (ibid., p. 226).
As these quotations demonstrate, Bachelard’s phenom-
enology is far removed from Husserl’s concept of phe-
nomenology. For Bachelard, phenomenology is ﬁrst of all a
phenomenology of images rather than of thoughts. Second,
phenomenology should primarily focus on images as they
are provided by poetry and daydreams. Third, people need
houses in order to daydream and to imagine. They need a
nest for dreaming. According to Bachelard, it therefore
makes sense to say that we ‘‘write a room,’’ ‘‘read a room’’,
or ‘‘read a house’’ (ibid., p. 14). The reading of poetry is
essential to grasp the speciﬁc human values of the material
world around us. Bachelard also speaks about ‘‘poetic
creation’’ and ‘‘poetic power.’’ That is why his book con-
tains a lot of quotations from Rilke, Baudelaire, George
Sand, Rimbaud, Paul Valery and many other poets and
novelists.
Although ‘‘home’’ and ‘‘house’’ have often been used
interchangeably, it makes sense to make a distinction
between the two concepts. The notion of home emphasizes
much more than the notion of house its psychological
signiﬁcance to individuals and its cultural, normative, and
moral meaning. Bachelard writes: ‘‘A house is ﬁrst and
foremost a geometrical object, one which we are tempted
to analyze rationally. Its prime reality is visible and tan-
gible, made of well hewn solids and well ﬁtted framework.
[…] But transposition to the human plane takes place
immediately whenever a house is considered as space for
cheer and intimacy, space that is supposed to condense and
defend intimacy’’ (ibid., p. 48). It appears from this quo-
tation that Bachelard somehow seems to blur the common
distinction between house and home, but he also empha-
sizes that being home is not just living in a house.
Bachelard’s phenomenology of the house is very con-
crete in the sense that he is interested in the meaning of all
the different places of a house, varying from the kitchen to
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example is the verticality of the house. Verticality consists
of the polarity of cellar and attic, in particular of the
opposition of the irrationality of the cellar to the rationality
of the roof. In his view, verticality is one of the principal
themes that a phenomenology of the house can provide us
(ibid., p. 18–29). It needs, however, some creative imagi-
nation from the reader to understand the opposition of the
rationality of the roof to the irrationality of the cellar. In
the words of Bachelard: when we dream of heights we are
in the rational zone of intellectualized projects; up near the
roof all our thoughts are clear. The cellar on the other hand
is ﬁrst and foremost ‘‘the dark entity of the house’’ (ibid.,
p. 18). When we dream there, we are in harmony with the
irrationality of the depths.
Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995): home
as the condition of life
‘‘The home, as a building, belongs to a world of objects.
But this belongingness does not nullify the bearing of the
fact that every consideration of objects, and of buildings
too, is produced out of a dwelling’’ (Levinas 1971, p. 151).
In Totality and Inﬁnity, Levinas (1971) devotes one
chapter to ‘‘The dwelling.’’ This chapter can be interpreted
as a discussion with Heidegger, but there are no references
to Bollnow and Bachelard. Still, most of Levinas’ thoughts
are in line with the basic views of the other three philos-
ophers, namely that dwelling is an essential characteristic
of being human.
8 Therefore, I conﬁne myself here to a few
comments.
According to Levinas, the home is not to be considered
as just an instrument (for example, to serve as a shelter
against the weather) amidst many other instruments that
human beings have at their disposal. Within the ‘‘system of
ﬁnalities in which human life maintains itself’’ (ibid.,
p. 152), home occupies a privileged place. Although one
can enjoy living in a home, the privileged role of the home
does not consist in being the end of human activity but in
being its condition and in this sense, its commencement.
Like Bollnow, Levinas opposes Heidegger’s descrip-
tions in Sein und Zeit. According to Heidegger, being not at
home is a fundamental aspect of our existence, although it
in our everyday life is hidden by the dominant being at
home in the world (Heidegger 1927, p. 188). As Bollnow
(1955) argues, being at home in the world is an existential
aspect of human beings and not reducible to an underlying
negative experience as it is in Heidegger’s analysis. Also
for Levinas, being at home is a necessary condition for
living our lives in the outside world. He writes: ‘‘Man
abides in the world as having come to it from a private
domain, from being at home with himself, to which at each
moment he can retire’’ (Levinas 1971, p. 152). Being at
home is the starting point and goal at the same time of our
being in the world. A human being ‘‘goes forth outside
from an inwardness’’ (ibid., p. 152).
This view of Levinas means that the dwelling is not
situated in and being derived from an objective world.
Rather, the objective world is situated in relation to the
dwelling. My dwelling constitutes the outside world. This
view also means a critical stance towards the idea of an
idealistic knowing subject for whose eyes the world
develops and opens up. Dwelling is basic to human exis-
tence. It might be considered as having the same function
as the thinking consciousness in Descartes’ philosophy.
Levinas rejects the Cartesian dichotomy of an external
world in which consciousness takes part through the sen-
ses. Our consciousness is already incarnated in the world.
‘‘Hence the subject contemplating a world presupposes the
event of dwelling, the withdrawal from the elements […],
recollection in the intimacy of the home’’ (ibid., p. 153).
Levinas describes dwelling as ‘‘a recollection, a coming
to oneself, a retreat home with oneself as in a land of
refuge, which answers to a hospitality, an expectancy, a
human welcome’’ (ibid., p. 156). According to him, the
primordial function of the home does not consist in ori-
enting our being in the world by the architecture of the
building and in the discovery of a site, but in ‘‘breaking the
plenum of the element, in opening in it the utopia in which
the ‘I’ recollects itself in dwelling at home with itself’’
(ibid., p. 156; italics added). Although Levinas does not
refer to Heidegger or Bollnow, he seems to criticize both
philosophers here. According to Levinas, the home does
not open up a sacred (holy) place, but a ‘‘u-topia’’ which
has the meaning here of a ‘‘non-place’’ or ‘‘non existing
place.’’ In such a utopia, the human being is preeminently
at home.
Home and world in case of dementia
The above presentation of the views of Heidegger, Boll-
now, Bachelard and Levinas shows that concepts such as
house, home and dwelling are used in very different ways.
Despite the differences, however, their views converge in
one point, that is, that they concern a most fundamental
aspect of human existence: being human is to dwell. The
writings presented here are not always easy to understand
and it needs a great deal of ‘‘creative imagination’’—to
speak with Bachelard—in order to grasp what they are
trying to convey. Nevertheless, I would like to make a few
8 Levinas writes: ‘‘To exist […] means to dwell’’ (Levinas 1971,
p. 156) and ‘‘With the dwelling the latent birth of the world is
produced’’ (ibid., p. 157).
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(1) for further home-oriented research in the ﬁeld of
dementia, (2) for the care of patients suffering from
dementia and (3) for a philosophical understanding of what
it means to suffer from dementia.
9
(1) A phenomenological approach of home can inspire
further research of the ways in which older and vulnerable
people experience home. Elderly people tend to lean more
heavily on their home environment than younger ones
(Krasner 2006). The literature suggests that elderly people
generally report a higher level of satisfaction with their
current homes than younger ones, although their residential
situation might be far from desirable or adequate. Elderly
people are generally reluctant to move to a new environ-
ment, but they are often forced to do so. For them, home
plays a critical role in maintaining a sense of personal
identity and independence, sustaining a meaningful exis-
tence, and resisting institutionalization (Kontos 1998).
A ﬁne example of home-based research is a qualitative
empirical study, based on a Heideggerian interpretive
phenomenological methodology, to understand the mean-
ing of living alone from the perspective of older people
with Alzheimer’s disease or a related dementia (De Witt
et al. 2010). One element of this study is especially of
interest here. While the focus was on ‘‘living alone,’’ that
is, on the lifeworld constituents spatiality and intersub-
jectivity, the empirical ﬁndings were for a great deal pre-
sented under the heading of a third constituent, that is,
temporality, with categories such as ‘‘stored time,’’
‘‘dreaded time,’’ and ‘‘limited time.’’ This overlap and
linkage illustrate the intertwining of the ﬁve standard
phenomenological constituents of the lifeworld.
Another study of the same authors was also based on
Heidegger’s, Bachelard’s and Bollnow’s writings (De Witt
et al. 2009). Now the authors focused especially on spati-
ality and spatial experience. The empirical ﬁndings were
put in a framework consisting of Heidegger’s description of
a threshold. The authors described the spatial experience of
‘‘living on the threshold’’ under the heading of four sub-
themes: (a) being here, (b) being there, (c) being out, and
(d) keeping out. Being here refers to being at home in one’s
own environment: ‘‘my home is my centre of my life;’’ ‘‘I
feel at home here because I’ve been here so long’’ (ibid.,
p. 276). Being there refers to living in a nursing home, the
destination that lay beyond the present homes of the in-
terviewees: ‘‘They tried to say … I needed the old people’s
home … They had a bed and I didn’t take it. ‘Cause I said
what do I need to go up there for? … They’re not gonna
shove me around unless I want to go’’ (ibid., p. 281). Being
out was synonymous with going shopping and visiting
family members and friends, everyday activities that many
of people without dementia take for granted: ‘‘I had tickets
to go see [name of play], but when it came to it I thought,
what’s the point of going? … I’m not gonna remember it
anyways’’ (ibid., p. 282). Keeping out refers to the expe-
rience of people with dementia living alone, how the world
that came to their doors posed a threat that must be kept out
in order to avoid harm: ‘‘Well, I don’t want to spend
money, I don’t give it away or anything, but if anybody
comes to the door, I don’t know them, I just say goodbye’’
(ibid., p. 283).
In my view, the authors (De Witt et al. 2009) rightly
conclude that a Heideggerian interpretation adds depth and
breadth to our understanding of the spatial experience of
older people with dementia. The spatial experience of these
people encompasses places beyond the boundaries of their
homes, such as stores, nursing homes, their adult children’s
homes, and the spatial experience created while getting out
to adult day programmes. The threshold phenomenon, as
has been described by Heidegger and Bollnow, provides a
natural ﬁt with the empirical ﬁndings. The interviewed
persons differentiated between the being here of living
alone in their own homes on the one hand, and the being
there of the nursing home and the being out in the com-
munity on the other.
(2) Many people suffering from dementia do not live in
their own house, but in a home for the elderly, a nursing
home, or a psychiatric institution. Care given to these
people should focus on making them feel at home in a
homelike ‘‘surrogate home.’’ Bachelard’s very concrete
phenomenology can play a role here. The architecture of
such a surrogate home can contribute considerably to the
well-being of its inhabitants. It is argued that architects of
nursing homes for persons with Alzheimer’s disease should
take into account the needs of patients and their caregivers
more carefully (Bermann 2003). Therefore, not only the
house, but also the home needs attention. Initiatives have
been taken to develop new environmental models of long-
term care and safe dwelling places for older people with
dementia based on a person-centred view of dementia and
an increasing understanding of the lived experience of
dementia (O’Sullivan 2000; Davis et al. 2009; Van Hoof
and Kort 2009).
Care for persons with dementia increasingly takes place
along with the demanding ideal of the so-called emotion-
oriented care based on the idea of a ‘‘person-centred
approach’’ (Kitwood 1997; Sabat 2001). Practising emo-
tion-oriented care means that caregivers should accept the
separation of their own lifeworld from that of the person
with dementia. However, while emotion-oriented care
9 Of the four authors presented here, only Heidegger refers to a
speciﬁc disease, namely depression. He argues that in states of
depression there is a loss of rapport with things and a change in the
‘‘staying with things’’ (Heidegger 1971, p. 157). This change in
relationship with the things in the outside world occurs in many more
diseases, especially in psychiatric disorders.
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shared lifeworld progresses. It is in this context, that some
central tenets of the ethics of care are relevant. Tronto
suggests that caring be viewed as ‘‘a species activity that
includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and
repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as
possible’’ (Tronto 1993, p. 103). This description of care
might be considered to be a late echo of Heidegger’s for-
mulation of the fourfold.
10 According to Heidegger, the
basic character of dwelling is to spare and to preserve.
Mortal human beings are in the world by preserving the
fourfold, that is, by saving the earth, receiving the sky,
awaiting the divinities and initiating their own nature. The
central question of the ethics of care could therefore be
formulated as follows: what do people need from other
people in order to experience their world as worth living in
and meaningful, in particular, as a home? The answer to
this question is not easily given when it comes to people
with dementia, especially severe dementia. The capacity of
these people to express what is of value in their life is
limited, although this capacity must certainly not be
underestimated.
(3) Concerning the fundamental level—being human is
dwelling—the relevance of a phenomenological approach
might even be more considerable. When it comes to vul-
nerable people such as patients suffering from dementia,
phenomenological descriptions drawn from those above
may help us to get insight into what it means to dwell while
suffering from dementia. In my view, it makes sense to
explore if and in what way we can say that a person suf-
fering from dementia has lost his or her capacity to dwell
and to be in contact with the things on earth. What does it
mean when we say that people suffering from dementia
have lost a common shared world of meaning or that they
have lost (parts of) the world? Does it make sense to say
that they are not at home any more in the world and
therefore homeless and ‘‘world-less’’ in a very fundamental
sense? Or are they not entirely homeless and ‘‘world-less’’,
but just in a gradual way? Has their home or world become
smaller? Further philosophical exploration must provide
the answers to questions like these.
Conclusion
In this paper I have presented some phenomenological
descriptions of house and home of Heidegger, Bollnow,
Bachelard and Levinas. I have conceived home as pri-
marily belonging to spatiality, that is, to one of the ﬁve
standard constituents of the lifeworld. I have chosen
dementia and the care for persons suffering from dementia
as an example in order to elucidate the scientiﬁc, practical
and philosophical signiﬁcance of a phenomenological
approach of home. This paper might be considered as an
attempt to switch from a ‘‘lifeworld-led health care’’ (To-
dres et al. 2007; Dahlberg et al. 2009) to a ‘‘home-led
healthcare.’’ The idea of home-led health care might lead to
an integrative framework that encompasses all ﬁve con-
stituents of the lifeworld and function as a philosophical
basis of all kinds of existing practices in health care in
general and palliative care for persons with dementia in
particular.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Bachelard, G. 1964. The poetics of space. Boston: Beacon Press.
Bermann, K. 2003. Love and space in the nursing home. Theoretical
Medicine 24: 511–523.
Bollnow, O. 1955. Neue Geborgenheit. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
Bollnow, O. 1961. Lived-space. Philosophy Today 5: 31–39.
Dahlberg, K., L. Todres, and K. Galvin. 2009. Lifeworld-led
healthcare is more than patient-led care: an existential view of
well-being. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12: 265–271.
Davis, S., S. Byers, R. Nay, and S. Koch. 2009. Guiding design of
dementia friendly environments in residential care settings.
Dementia 8(2): 185–203.
Dekkers, W. 2009. On the notion of home and the goals of palliative
care. Theoretical Medicine & Bioethics 30(5): 335–349.
Dekkers, W. 2010. Persons with severe dementia and the notion of
bodily autonomy. In Supportive Care for the Person with
Dementia, ed. J.C. Hughes, M. Lloyd-Williams, and G.A. Sachs,
253–261. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
de Visscher, J. 1991. Wonen: de nabijheid van de ander in de
bezieling van de dingen. In Wonen: architectuur in het denken
van Heidegger, ed. J. de Visscher, and R. de Saeger, 117–146.
Nijmegen: SUN.
de Visscher, J. (ed.). 1998. Over de drempel. Van architectonisch
minimum tot symbolisch maximum. Best: Damon/Kritak.
de Visscher, J. 1999. Naakt geboren. Over herbergzaamheid,
lijfelijkheid, subjectiviteit en wereldlijkheid. Leende: Damon.
de Witt, L., J. Ploeg, and M. Black. 2009. Living on the threshold.
The spatial experience of living alone with dementia. Dementia
8(2): 263–291.
de Witt, L., J. Ploeg, and M. Black. 2010. Living alone with dementia:
an interpretive phenomenological study. Journal of Advanced
Nursing 66(8): 1698–1707.
Heidegger, M. 1927. Sein und Zeit.T u ¨bingen: Niemeyer.
Heidegger, M. 1971. Building dwelling thinking. In Poetry, language,
thought, ed. Heidegger, M, 145–161. (Translation and introduc-
tion: Albert Hofstadter). New York: Harper & Row.
Hertogh, C.M.P.M., and B.A.M. The. 2008. The loss of a common
shared world. Ethical problems in palliative care for people with
advanced dementia [Ethische vragen in de palliatieve zorg voor
mensen met dementia]. Tijdschrift voor Gerontologie en Geri-
atrie 39(6): 265–272.
10 Tronto explicitly refers to Heidegger’s description of care
(‘‘Sorge’’) as a fundamental aspect of ‘‘Dasein’’ (Tronto 1993,p .3 ,
118, 125).
Dwelling, house and home 299
123Hughes, J.C. 2001. Views of the person with dementia. Journal of
Medical Ethics 27: 86–91.
Hughes, J.C., S.J. Louw, and S.R. Sabat (eds.). 2006. Dementia. Mind,
meaning, and the person. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jacobson, K. 2009. A developed nature: a phenomenological account
of the experience of home. Continental Philosophical Review 42:
355–373.
Kalis, A., M.H.N. Schermer, and J.J.M. van Delden. 2005. Ideals
regarding a good life for nursing home residents with dementia:
views of professional caregivers. Nursing Ethics 12(1): 30–42.
Kitwood, T. 1997. Dementia Reconsidered. The Person Comes First.
Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press.
Kontos, P.C. 1998. Resisting institutionalization: Constructing old
age and negotiating home. Journal of Aging Studies 12:
167–184.
Kontos, P.C. 2005. Embodied selfhood in Alzheimer’s disease.
Dementia 4(4): 553–570.
Krasner, J. 2006. Accumulated lives: Metaphor, materiality, and the
homes of the elderly. Literature and Medicine 24: 209–230.
Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press.
Leder, D. 1990. The absent body. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Levinas, E. 1971. Totality and inﬁnity. An essay on exteriority. The
Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Meijer, M. 1992. ‘Thuis’ is het sleutelwoord. De Bazuin 18: 24–26.
Meijer, M. 1993. Alleen God weet nog waar ik woon. Pastorale zorg
in het verpleeghuis. Speling: 62–66.
Moore, J. 2000. Placing home in context. Journal of Environmental
Psychology 20: 207–217.
O’Sullivan, M. 2000. At home with dementia (http://www.
dadhc.nsw.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D87FA83D-4E00-446B-A6B9-
7CCE54143820/4024/AtHomeDementia_manual.pdf).
Perkins, H., D. Thorns, A. Winstanley, and B. Newton. 2002. The
study of ‘home’ from a social scientiﬁc perspective: An
annotated bibliography, 2nd ed. New Zealand: Canterbury.
Phinney, A., and C.A. Chesla. 2003. The lived body in dementia.
Journal of Aging Studies 17: 283–299.
Sabat, S.R. 2001. The Experience of Alzheimer’s Disease. Life
Through a Tangled Veil. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
Spiegelberg, H. 1982. The phenomenological movement. A historical
introduction, Third and enlarged edition ed. The Hague/Boston/
London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Svenaeus, F. 2000. Das unheimliche—towards a phenomenology of
illness. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 3: 3–16.
Svenaeus, F. 2001. The Hermeneutics of medicine and the phenom-
enology of health. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Svenaeus, F. 2002. The phenomenology of health and illness. In
Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine, ed. S.K. Toombs,
87–108. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Todres, L., K. Galvin, and K. Dahlberg. 2007. Lifeworld-led
healthcare: revisiting a humanising philosophy that integrates
emerging trends. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10:
53–63.
Toombs, S.K. (ed.). 2001. Handbook of Phenomenology and Med-
icine. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tronto, J.C. 1993. Moral Boundaries. A Political Argument for an
Ethic of Care. New York/London: Routledge.
van Hoof, J., and H.S.M. Kort. 2009. Supportive living environments.
A ﬁrst concept of a dwelling designed for older adults with
dementia. Dementia 8(2): 293–316.
300 W. Dekkers
123